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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RONALD JOE MINNISH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 14113 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
Ronald Joe Minnish was charged in a criminal 
proceeding by the State of Utah with the crime of 
Murder in the Second Degree pursuant to Section 76-5-203, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 1973. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On May 14, 1975, Ronald Joe Minnish, was found 
guilty of Murder in the Second Degree as charged in the 
Information by a jury in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an Order of this Court reversing 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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< 
the Judgment rendered by the Trial Court and a ruling 
remanding the case to the Trial Court for re-trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 13, 1974 at about 10:00 P.M. 
Lynn Steven Pearson was shot in an altercation at the 
Indigo Lounge in Salt Lake City, Utah. He died the 
next day as a result of that gunshot wound,* 
The Appellant, Ronald Joe Minnish, was charged 
with second degree murder for the death of Lynn Steven 
Pearson, and tried before a jury. 
At the trial, evidence was introduced that the 
Appellant arried at the Indigo Lounge at around 3:00 P.M. 
on the afternoon of December 13, 1974.(T (2)102) From the 
time of the Appellant's arrival until about 7:00 P.M. the 
Appellant consumed a substantial quantity of alcoholic 
beverages. (T(2)17,40,104) At around 7:00 P.M. that even-
ing, the Appellant began playing "pinball" at the lounge. 
(T92)19) At around 8:30 P.M. the victim, Lynn Steven Pearson, 
an acquaintance of the Appellant, entered the lounge. Both 
the Appellant and the victim played "pinball" and drank 
alcoholic beverages until about 9:30 P.M. At that time, they 
sat down together at the bar and talked. (T92)21) 
* T(l) indicates transcript of first day, T(2)indicates 
transcript of second day, T(3) indicates transcript of 
third day. 
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The evidence introduced by the State indicated 
that while they were sitting at the bar both individuals 
may have spoken in loud voices. (T(l)22) (T(l)27) The 
Appellant, when he took the stand, recalled that they 
were not arguing, but were merely discussing professional 
boKing and other topics. (T92)107)(T(l)27) 
The Appellant got up from the booth, put on his 
coat, and left the lounge. Then within a few minutes the 
victim also left the lounge. (T(l)27) The Appellant testified 
that he was leaving the lounge to go to a friend's home. 
(T(2)109) 
Outside, in front of the lounge, the victim, Lynn 
Pearson and the Appellant talked for a few moments. (T(2)29) 
Then Pearson hit the Appellant in the face and the Appellant 
fell to the ground. While the Appellant was on the ground, 
Pearson kicked him in the stomach. (T(l)30) 
Lynn Pearson then returned to the lounge. The 
Appellant walked over to his truck which was in the parking 
lot. The Appellant by all accounts of the incident was 
bleeding profusely from the mouth and nose as a result of 
the blows which were struck. (T(l)68) (T(l)43) 
Lynn Pearson came back into the bar and told Fred 
Manning a patron of the lounge, that he had hit the Appellant 
hard and had hurt him. (T(2)26) He went outside again and 
talked to the Appellant while the Appellant was standing 
next to his truck. 
-3-
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The Appellant at this time took his .38 caliber 
revolver from his truck. (t(2)lll) The Appellant testified ( 
that he did so in order to defend himself from Pearson. 
(T(2)lll) He testified that he went back into the lounge 
to call his girl friend for help and to get cleaned up. ( 
(T(2)lll) He testified that the victim said to him that 
"looks like a person is just going to have to kick the 
shit out of you and just kill you and get it done with." 
(T(2)lll) 
Inside the bar, the Appellant entered the bar 
and approached Pearson.(T(l)34) The testimony indicated 
that Pearson said to the Appellant, "Well, I went outside 
and showed you that I wasn't afraid of you." "What do 
i 
you want me to do now." (T(l) 34) The Appellant pulled 
the revolver out of his pocket and pointed it in the direction 
of the victim. (T(l) 35) Pearson then picked up a nearby 
metal bar stool and threw it at the Appellant, striking 
him in the chest. (T(l) 35, 47 T(2) 34) Then Fred Manning, 
a friend of Pearsons, grabbed the arm of the Appellant, in which 
the Appellant was holding the gun. (T(2)59 After a brief 
struggle, Fred Manning was thrown to the side and the gun 
was discharged, striking the victim in the chest. (T(l) 36, 
(T(2) 36). 
The Appellant then left the lounge and got into 
his truck. At about 10:30 P.M. that evening he was pulled 
over and arrested while driving west bound on 3500 South. 
-4-
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The arresting officer testified that the Appellant 
was having difficulty driving and was disoriented and 
confused when he got out of the car. (T(2)2) Evidence 
was introduced by defendant that the Appellant had a 
blood alcohol content of .19 percent by weight at 
1:05 A.M. on the 14th day of December. (T(2)98) The 
Appellant testified that he was extremely intoxicated 
and had trouble recalling clearly the incidents that 
had taken place on that evening. (T(2)110) The Appellant 
introduced expert testimony of Dr. Stewart C. Harvey, who 
testified at length concerning the effects of great 
quantities of alcohol as had been consumed by the 
Appellant on the emotional mental state of a person. 
(T(3) 1 to 21). 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN EXCLUDING ALL EVIDENCE OF THE CHARACTER OF THE 
VICTIM AS TO HIS PROPENSITY FOR VIOLENCE AND AGGRESSIVE-
NESS. 
Counsel for the Appellant in the opening 
statement to the jury stated that the evidence would 
show that about one year prior to the incident for 
which the Appellant was charged, the victim, Lynn 
Pearson was involved in another similar altercation 
at the same lounge. This evidence would show that in 
this prior altercation the victim, Lynn Pearson, was the 
-5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
aggressor. 
Before calling the defense witnesses necessary 
to establish this prior incident, as well as several 
other witnesses to other prior incidents, a Motion was 
made by the State to exclude this evidence. The attorney 
for the Appellant then made a proffer for the purpose 
of perserving a record which indicated that the defense 
would call a Mr. Tom Osborn who would testify that the 
victim had a year before the incident intentionally 
struck and knocked another person to the ground. (T(2)86) 
The evidence would show that this altercation had taken 
place at the Indigo Lounge and the attack occurred 
without any provocation by the victim. (T(2)86) 
The Trial Court ruled that this evidence Wets 
inadmissible. The Court stated that "the fact that a 
man had a fight a year prior to this particular shooting, 
with somebody who had no connection at all with a 
shooting, unknown to the defendant, is not proper evidence. 
(T(2) at 95) 
The evidence offered by the Appellant was material 
and probative in relation to several important issues in 
the case. First, the evidence introduced by defendant 
indicated that there may have been communicated to the 
defendant by the victim that the victim intended to kill 
the Appellant. (See e.g. T(3)25, T(2)lll) Evidence of 
the propensity of the victim for violence and aggressiveness 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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would corroborate the defendant's evidence that he was 
justified in resorting to the use of force in self-defense. 
Secondly, the evidence would be material and relevant to 
prove the defendant's contention that the victim was the 
aggressor and not the defendant and that after the 
initial assault on the defendant by the victim, the victim 
continued to be the aggressor in the situation. 
The general rule is outlined and annotated in 
1 
1 ALR 3d 571 at Section 8 which states: 
" . . . it has generally been held that 
evidence of the turbulent character of 
the deceased or party assaulted is 
admissible in a trial for homicide or 
assault or tending to corroborate 
testimony of the accused as to the 
circumstances of the conflict, whether 
the accused had knowledge of such 
character or not, (emphasis added) 
This rule was applied in State v. Griffin, 99 
Ariz. 43, 406 P. 2d 397 (1965). In that case, the 
defendant in the course of the trial had raised the issue 
of self-defense and attempted to present evidence of the 
victim's reputation for the character traits of belligerance 
and quarrelsomeness, which the trial court had excluded. 
The Arizona Supreme Court held that where the issue of 
self defense is raised, evidence of the reputation of the 
deceased for aggressiveness and belligerance while intox-
icated is admissible even where such character traits are 
1. 1 ALR 3d 571 (1965) , supplementing 64 ALR 1029 (1929) 
and cases cited therein. 
-7-
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uncommunicated to the defendant. The Court quoted jL 
Wigmore on Evidence, Section 63 which states: 
"When the issue of self-defense is 
made in a trial for homicide and then 
a controversy occurswhether the dec-
eased was the agressor, ones persuasion 
will be more or less affected by the 
character of the deceased; it may throw 
much light on the probabilities of the 
deceased's action. . . [The] additional 
element of communication is unnecessary 
for the question is what the deceased 
probably did, not what the defendant 
probably thought he was going to do. 
The inquiry is one of objective occur-
ance, not subjective belief." 
See also the leading case of Evans v. United States, 
277 F. 2d 354, 1 ALR 3d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1960) and 
Jones on Evidence, 6th Edition, Section 4:40 (1972). 
The position taken by Professor Wigmore as 
to the type of evidence was cited and approved by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Mares, 113 
Utah 225, 192 P. 2d 861 (Utah 1948). The defendant 
introduced evidence on the issue of self-defense including 
the deceased's propensity to become hostile and aggressive. 
The Supreme Court held that the State could offer evidence 
of the victim's character^ and reputation for peacefulness. 
The Court said that the principle involved with this 
type of evidence is "what did the deceased probably do?" 
Evidence of the probability of the deceased having acted 
consistent with this character at the time of the shooting 
was found by the Court to be relevant and admissible. This 
decision applying the State's correlative right to introduce 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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testimony of the deceased's good character establishs 
that Utah follows the general rule. An example of the 
application of the general rule to facts similar to those 
at issue in the present case is Cole v. State, 193 So. 2d 
47 (Fla. 1966). In Cole, the shooting took place in a 
bar where the victim, with a knife in his hand, had gone 
over to where the defendant was sitting and stopped the 
defendant. After the victim had retreated ten to twelve feet 
the defendant fired a shot that struck the victim in the 
stomach and killed him. The defendant's attorney attempted 
to introduce evidence of the fact that the decedent had a 
record for knifings and was a violent person. The trial 
court excluded this proffered evidence because the defendant 
was not shown to be aware or have any knowledge of the incidents. 
The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence 
was admissible even though uncommunicated to the defendant 
because the proffered testimony as to the violent and 
dangerous character of the defendant was admissible to explain 
or give significance to the conduct of the deceased in order 
to determine the validity of the issue of self defense. 
Since the character of the deceased for turbulence 
and violence is admissible and relevant, the general rule 
allows such character to be proven by the use of particular 
instances of violence, such as that proffered by the 
defendant in the instant case. As Professor Wigmore states 
the rule: :^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
2 
"When the turbulent character of the deceased 
in a prosecution for homicide is relevant. . ., 
there is no substantial reason against 
evidencing the character by particular instances 
of violent or quarrelsome conduct, 
Wigmore also,points out in his treatise the important 
distinction that the prohibitory consideration applicable 
to a criminal defendant's character have little or no 
force as a reason for excluding this evidence when the person 
whose character is at issue is not a party. In Dempsey v. 
State, 266 S. W. 2d 875 (Tex. Ct. Crim. Appls. 1954) the 
Texas court held that specific acts of violence offered 
for the purpose of showing that the deceased was in fact 
the agressor are admissible without the necessity of proving 
that the defendant had any knowledge of those specific acts. 
Under Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
effective July 1, 1971; 
"When a person's character or trait 
of his character is in issue, it may 
be proved by testimony in the form of 
opinion evidence of reputation, or -
evidence of specific instances of the 
persons conduct, subject, however, to 
the limitations of Rules 47 and 48. 
Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
"Subject to Rule 48, when a person's 
character is relevant as tending to 
prove his conduct on a specific occasion 
such trait may be proved in the same 
manner as provided by Rule 46, except 
2. Vol. 1 Wigmore on Evidence (1940) and supp. 1975) 
Section 198; Character of the Deceased, in homicide, from 
Particular Acts of Violence (page 676). See also, Jones 
on Evidence, 6th Ed., Section 4:43 (1972). 
-10-
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that (a) evidence of specific instances 
of conduct other than evidence of con-
viction of a crime which tends to prove 
the trait to be bad shall be inadmissible. .M 
Rules 47 and 48 like the general rule provide that 
character in issue may be proved by evidence of specific 
instances of conduct. The limitation of Rule 48 on evidence 
of specific instances of conduct which tend to prove the trait 
to be bad is designed to exclude evidence that has probative 
value only to circumstantially show that the person against 
whom it is offered did not have a good character. Jones on 
Evidence, 6th Edition/ Section 4:44 and 4:43, page 472. 
(See footnote 18). 
The effect of the combination of these rules 
is similar to Rule 405 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
which allows evidence of character to be proved in any event 
by reputation testimony but allow specific acts of misconduct 
only in cases where a trait of character is an essential 
3 
element of a charge or defense. When the character of the 
accused is not directly in issue, as it was in the present 
case, and the evidence of specific acts of misconduct are 
admitted only for the purpose of tending to prove the bad 
character of the person , such evidence would be inadmissible. 
Therefore, the Appellant submits that the Trial 
Court's exclusion of this evidence was prejudicial error and 
the conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
3. See McCormick on Evidence, 2nd Edition, by Edward Cleary 
(1972) Chp. 17, Sec. 188, page 445. 
- n _ 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ' 
AS TO THE CRIME OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER. 
The defendant was charged under three different 
theories of Second Degree Murder. He was charged in the 
Information of having committed the offense under any 
of the following circumstances: 
^ 
(a) Knowingly or intentionally having caused 
the death of another; 
(b) Intending to cause serious bodily injury 
to another, he committed an act clearly 
dangerous to human life which caused the 
death of the victim; or, i 
(c) Acting under circumstances evidencing 
a^depraved indiffereance to human life, he 
recklessly engaged in conduct which created 
a grave risk of death to another and caused 
the death of the victim. (R. 15) 
< 
Counsel for the Appellant, at the close of the 
State's case in chief, made a Motion to that subsection 
(c) of the Information based on Utah Code Annotated 76-5-203 
(c) should have been stricken because this theory was not supported 
by any reasonable interpretation of the evidence. (T(2)78). 
The Trial Court denied this Motion after taking the motion ^ 
under advisement and instructed the jury as to this theory. 
(See Instruction No. 14 and No. 15, R. 52, R. 54). The Counsel 
for the Appellant objected to the instruction of the jury on this j 
theory of Second Degree Murder. (T(3)30). 
Utah Code Annotated 76-5-203 (c) (Amended 1973) states 
that criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second degree | 
if the actor: 
-12-
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(c) acting under circumstances evidencing 
a depraved indifference to human life, he 
recklessly engaged in conduct which created 
. a grave risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another. . . • 
In State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P. 2d 
1003 (1944), this Court explained the scope of the section of the 
former first degree murder statute that is similar to the 
present section at issue in the case of the Appellant. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-30-3 (repealed 1973) stated "every 
murder perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to the lives 
of others and evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of human 
life, is murder in the first degree." In Russell, this Court 
said that this section requires an act which is also dangerous to 
other persons and not directed at any one person in particular. 
The Court said that this type of statutory language is designed 
to cover the situation where the defendant's acts are calculated 
to put the lives of many persons generally and indiscriminately 
in jeopardy. The scope of this type of provision was also 
explained in State v. Weddle, 29 Utah 2d 464, 511 P. 2d 733 
(1973) where the Court found that the evidence must reveal an 
act directed at other persons generally. 
The Appellant submits that the evidence presented 
by the State did not justify the submission to the jury of the 
theory based on subsection (c) of Section 76-5-203. The 
evidence did not disclose that the Appellant created a grave 
risk of death to any person other than the victim or that the 
Appellant acted with depraved indifferance to human life. 
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( 
The erroneous instruction prejudicially and materially 
affected the Appellant's right to a fair trial and 
the conviction should be reversed and a new trial granted. 
III. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF SECOND DEGREE 
MURDER. 
The Appellant submits that the evidence presented 
was not sufficient to justify the verdict of the jury on the 
grounds of second degree^iurder and that as a matter of law the crime 
of second degree murder should not have been submitted to the 
jury. The attorney for the Appellant at the close of the 
State's case made a Motion to Dismiss for failure to prove a 
prima-facie case with respect to second degree murder. (T(2)78) 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the Trial 
Court committed reversable errors in not granted the Appellant's 
motion. 
DATED this 1st day of Oc/tbber , 1976. 
Respectful&v* Sublet tec^ f 
/JIM, , , 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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